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Ecumenical Evangelical Legal
Thought: The Contributions
of Robert F. Cochran, Jr.
William S. Brewbaker III*

Abstract
This Essay organizes an assessment of Robert F. Cochran's
scholarly contributionsaround the theme of "ecumenicalevangelical legal thought. " ProfessorCochran'swork bears the hallmarks
of evangelicalism in its emphasis on the Bible, its practicalfocus,
and its willingness to cross institutionaland theologicallines. The
Essay recounts some formative influences on Professor Cochran,
discusses his methodology as a Christian scholar and specifically
his use of the Bible in thinking about law, his work in legal ethics,
and his work as a movement-builder. It concludes with some observations about the reconciliationof ecumenism and evangelicalism in Cochran'swork and its implicationsfor the future.

* Rose Professor of Law, The University of Alabama. I am grateful to Bob Cochran for comments on an earlier draft.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In this Essay, I will argue that Bob Cochran's scholarly legacy is an approach to law and legal theory that I will label "ecumenical evangelical legal
thought." No one who knows Bob or knows his work will be surprised at the
"evangelical" portion of that label. (Sadly, I feel the need to emphasize that I
am using evangelical in the longstanding sense of a theological movement
that has historically been compatible with a wide range of political positions.')
Bob is a born (again)-and-bred evangelical, whose life exemplifies the hallmarks of traditional evangelical Christianity: a focus on the Bible, the singular
importance of Christ's atoning death, the need for personal conversion, and
an activist approach to spreading the Gospel and social action. 2
In the era during which Bob (and I) came of age, however, the words
ecumenical and evangelical did not go together. 3 Evangelicals in the 1970s
and 1980s associated the ecumenical movement with what they saw as the
mainline Protestant establishment's capitulation to theological liberalism.4
While theological liberalism is a contested concept,5 evangelicals generally
think of theology as "liberal" to the degree that it limits Christian doctrine to
things human reason (as understood by the Enlightenment) can accept, rather
than affirming the teaching of Scripture as understood by the church through

1. The Trump era (more particularly the behavior of "evangelical" leaders like Franklin Graham
and Jerry Falwell, Jr.) has led many Christians to wonder whether they can still call themselves evangelical. See, e.g., Peter Wehner, Why I Can No Longer CallMyself an EvangelicalRepublican, N.Y.

TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/20 17/12/09/opinion/sunday/wehner-evangelical-republicans.html [https://nyti.ms/2j CGudG].
2. See DAVID W. BEBBINGTON, EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN BRITAIN: A HISTORY FROM THE

1730S TO THE 1980S, at 217 (1989).
3. Neither did the words "catholic" and "evangelical," although today, it is not difficult to find an
evangelical who identifies as "catholic" or even a Catholic who identifies as evangelical.
4. Political liberalism was also important, as were issues of class and race. To evangelicals, the
flagship organization of Protestant ecumenism-the National Council of Churches-was not an admirable attempt to move toward renewed Christian unity (something Christ himself emphasizes in the
prayers recorded in John 17), but an establishment interest group with a social gospel political agenda.
Charles Austin, National CouncilofChurchesFacesa New Type ofCritic, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,1982),

https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/03/us/national-council-of-churches-faces-new-type-of-critic.html
[https://nyti.ms/29yVIhY]. The mainline denominations were populated by the economically and politically powerful. Sadly, racism undoubtedly played a role in evangelical resistance to liberalism,
especially in the South. See JEMAR TISBY, THE COLOR OF COMPROMISE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
AMERICAN CHURCH'S COMPLICITY IN RACISM (2019). Needless to say, a full treatment of these issues

goes well beyond the scope of this Essay.
5.

See 3 GARY DORRIEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERAL THEOLOGY: CRISIS, IRONY, AND

POSTMODERNITY, 1950-2005 (2006).
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the centuries.6
A few decades later, things look a little-though not entirely-different.
During the closing decades of the twentieth century, evangelicals developed
their own version of ecumenism. On one hand, they continued to leave mainline Protestant churches, and those denominations have continued to fragment
along traditional vs. liberal theological lines. 7 On the other hand, evangelicals
have been inclined to join together in spreading the Gospel and doing works
of mercy and justice through cooperative ventures that cross denominational
lines ("parachurch organizations").8 In such settings and elsewhere, an evangelical Methodist or Presbyterian might feel more at home with a fellow evangelical of another theological heritage (or even a traditional Catholic) than
with a more theologically liberal inheritor of her own tradition.
One area of continuity, from then to now, is that evangelicals have always
prided themselves on being practically oriented. One did not have to have a
Ph.D. from Princeton or Yale to spread the Gospel, and many would have
argued that this sort of education was likely to be a positive impediment to
God's work in the world. To know and follow the words of Scripture was the
main thing, and one could gain this knowledge on one's own, at a Bible college, or at one of the many denominational or independent seminaries that

6. See generally Gerald R. McDermott, The Emerging Divide in Evangelical Theology, 56 J.
EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL SOC'Y 355 (2013) (comparing the evolution of evangelical thought, par-

ticularly in terms of liberalism and conservativism, to other Protestant and Catholic traditions).
7. See PEW RESEARCH

CTR., AMERICA'S CHANGING RELIGIOUS

LANDSCAPE 4 (2015),

https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
Report PDF").

(follow "Complete

8. Michael S. Hamilton, American Evangelicalism: Character, Function, and Trajectories of
Change, in THE FUTURE OF EVANGELICALISM IN AMERICA 18, 30 (Candy Gunther Brown & Mark

Silk eds., 2016).
9. Significant numbers of evangelicals have since discovered that their own theology was more
"liberal" than they thought. In the course of looking for ways to spread the Gospel in the nineteenth
century, evangelical churches unwittingly borrowed (and retained) some then-current assumptions of
the Enlightenment that were overly optimistic about the capacity of human reason to achieve a God'seye view of the world. See generally MARK A. NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND

(1994). This was in direct contradiction to the traditional Protestant understanding of the effects of
sin on the intellect, as well as traditional Christian understandings of human finitude and the particularity of Christian belief. While commitment to the Bible's authority remains a hallmark of evangelicalism, there is perhaps a greater recognition now of Scripture's narrative context, and the tension
between the fundamental presuppositions of Christian and secular worldviews. Evangelicals are also
giving greater attention to the fact that Christianity is not solely a matter of intellectual assent to propositional truth but is primarily a matter of the affections of the heart. See generallyJAMES K.A. SMITH,
DESIRING THE KINGDOM (2009).
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were formed in reaction to theological drift in the mainline seminaries. Although this tendency can easily devolve into anti-intellectualism (and has all
too often done so), its positive side is its assumption that theological
knowledge is given for the purpose of being acted upon; as St. Paul writes,
"Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up."o Evangelicalism was (and mostly
remains) populist, practical, and movement-oriented.
This too-brief sketch of the evangelical state of affairs will, I hope, provide some context for what I mean when I describe Professor Cochran's work
as ecumenical evangelical legal thought. Professor Cochran's work bears the
hallmarks of evangelicalism in its emphasis on the Bible, its practical focus,
and its willingness to work across institutional and theological lines. I begin
the Essay by recounting, in Part II, some influences and experiences that I take
to be formative of Professor Cochran and therefore of his work." Part III
discusses Cochran's methodology as a Christian scholar and specifically his
use of the Bible in thinking about law. 12 Part IV discusses the practical aspects
of Cochran's scholarship with particular focus on his work in legal ethics. 13
Part V briefly discusses Cochran's work as a movement-builder." I conclude
with some observations about the reconciliation of ecumenism and evangelicalism in Cochran's work and its implications for the future."
II.

BOB COCHRAN'S VIEW FROM SOMEWHERE

Bob Cochran was born in Greenville, South Carolina, and raised in various cities in Virginia, where his father, Robert F. Cochran, pastored Baptist
churches. The elder Cochran was not just a Southern Baptist, but also an
evangelical in the sense described above. 16 One of Bob's prized possessions
is a photograph of his father with a very young Billy Graham, who had come
to Columbia, South Carolina, to speak for the parachurch organization Youth
for Christ, which had been founded by Mr. Cochran.
In the fall of 1973, Bob arrived in Charlottesville to begin his studies at

10. 1 Corinthians8:1 (New Revised Standard Version).
11.
12.
13.
14.

See
See
See
See

infra Part II.
infra Part III.
infra Part IV.
infra Part V.

15. See infra Part VI.
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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the University of Virginia School of Law. Two developments of special significance are worth noting. First, Bob was one of the founding members of
the Law Christian Fellowship, a group of law students that met regularly for
prayer and Bible study (and still does).17 Second, in Bob's third year, his
mentor and future co-author, Professor Thomas Shaffer of Notre Dame Law
School, arrived at the law school as a visiting faculty member. 1" Shaffer offered a class on law and religion, which Bob would later describe in memorable terms:
[Shaffer] volunteered to teach a course on law and religion, in addition to his regular courses. The Dean allowed it. We met in the home
that Shaffer and his wife Nancy rented. On the first evening, we went
around the room and told why we were taking the class. All of the
students identified themselves as Christians (though we might not all
have recognized one another as such). We came from a wide variety
of theological backgrounds-Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, an Armenian Orthodox, and a Mennonite. When
Shaffer realized that we were all confessing Christians, he asked one
of us to pray. As we bowed, I envisioned Thomas Jefferson, the
founder of the University of Virginia and proponent of a "wall of
separation" between church and state, looking down on us. He was
not pleased. To this Baptist boy, however, it seemed to balance
things out when we closed the class with beer.19
I am not certain whether this class was the beginning of Bob's evangelical
ecumenism, but it was likely an important contributor. Not only, as he notes
above, were the members of the class from a wide variety of church backgrounds, but Shaffer himself was the product of a remarkable convergence of
religious influences-a Baptist who converted to Catholicism but whose chief
20
intellectual influences were Anabaptist.

17. See OurPeople: Bob Cochran, CTR. FOR CHRISTIAN STUDY, https://www.studycenter.net/peo-

ple/bob-cochran (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
18. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., American Lawyers and Their Communities: Ethics in the Legal Profession, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 751, 752 (2001) (reviewing THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER,
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991)).
19. Id.
20. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 218-20 (1981) [hereinafter
SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN] (describing his spiritual journey and characterizing both the Baptist

236
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.mDers or tme unmversity or virgiia Law tnristian renowsnip, assei
Wedding of Bob Cochran (center, standing), June 19, 1982.

Shaffer's groundbreaking book, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer,
emerged out of this class.2 In the afterword to the book, Shaffer expresses
attitudes toward students, teaching, and scholarship that would be reflected in
Cochran's work going forward:
I began this enterprise, and continue it, as a law teacher-nothing
more than that, but nothing less. Not a word is written ex cathedra.
How could it be? But every word is written because my students

and Catholic church communities of which he was a part as "tragic"); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The
RadicalReformation and the Jurisprudenceof Forgiveness, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL

THOUGHT 321 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001)
[hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES].
21. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN, supra note 20, at 227.
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raise personal, confusing questions about being lawyers and Christians and Jews. My confusion was blessed, early on, by a group of
law students at the University of Virginia, in 1975 and 1976. They
were members of the Christian Law-Student Fellowship there and
were enrolled in a group-study venture, in which I taught and learned,
that was called law and religion. All of them are now about their
professional apostolates; I think of them often as a special audience
for which I write. They are: [students in the class, including Cochran,
listed by name]. 2 2
The Law Fellowship connection continued when Bob stayed in Charlottesville
following graduation; he remained involved as a mentor to law students. His
relationship with Tom Shaffer continued as well when Shaffer moved to
Washington & Lee University, and thereafter, back to Notre Dame. 23 Shaffer
guided Cochran into law teaching and in his work as a scholar. 24
A final important influence on Bob's thought has been, of course, the
Pepperdine community itself Although he was not a Church of Christ member, Bob-now Professor Cochran-found Pepperdine Caruso Law School to
be a congenial place to pursue his ambition to connect his faith and legal
scholarship. 25 Indeed, Cochran's interests in doing legal scholarship eventually helped increase the law school's emphasis on scholarly writing as a regular part of faculty responsibilities.
III. TOWARD A BIBLICAL UNDERSTANDING OF LAW
Given Professor Cochran's background, it is not surprising that his ambition would be to bring his faith to bear on his work. 26 The critical question,
however, is what it would mean to do so. One would assume that, as an evangelical, he would be inclined to give biblical revelation pride of place in such
a project. But the details of even that approach are far from obvious. A number of critical questions present themselves: What relevance might the Bible

22. Id.
23. See Cochran, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. Years ago, he told me that "Pepperdine is on the far-left end of the Churches of Christ, which
makes it a pretty comfortable place for a garden-variety evangelical to be."
26. Even without the specifics of Bob's background, one would not be surprised at the ambition.
Human beings seem inclined to connect the most important features of their lives with their understanding of life in general.
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have to a secular society's legal system? What is the relationship between
what the Bible says about morality to civil law? What status should be given
to the portions of the Bible that served as the civil law for ancient Israel?
Should they be followed? What about those parts of the Bible that cannot be
reduced to moral principle or civil command? Do these portions have any
relevance to the Christian legal scholar? Not only that, but how is the Bible
to be interpreted? Should it be read through the lens of a particular faith tradition? Must it be?
A.

Scripture and Law: Cochran the Evangelical

Professor Cochran's work answers most of these questions, implicitly in
some cases, explicitly in others, and with varying degrees of detail. As noted,
and not surprisingly, the Bible is front and center in Cochran's work. Indeed,
the introduction to his co-edited (with seminary professor David VanDrunen)
volume, entitled Law and the Bible: Justice, Mercy, and Legal Institutions,
begins with a lengthy excerpt from Psalm 19, formatted so as to consume the
entire first page:
The law of the LORD is perfect,
refreshing the soul.
The statutes of the LORD are trustworthy,
making wise the simple.
The precepts of the LORD are right,
giving joy to the heart.
The commands of the LORD are radiant,
giving light to the eyes.
The fear of the LORD is pure,
enduring forever.
The decrees of the LORD are firm,
and all of them are righteous.
They are more precious than gold,
than much pure gold;
they are sweeter than honey,
than honey from the honeycomb.2 7

27. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & David VanDrunen, Introductionto LAW AND THE BIBLE: JUSTICE,
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As the title of the book illustrates, Cochran's work 28 begins in faith that
the Bible will, in fact, have something meaningful to say about justice, mercy,
and legal institutions. Not only that, he also assumes that what it has to say
can often be translated into insights about what the content of the law should

be:
What the Bible has to say about law is important for all the reasons
that what the Bible has to say about anything is important. The Bible
shows us God's will and character as it reveals him to us. The Bible
reveals that God is our creator and that law springs from his will and
reflects his holy character. The great hope of the Scriptures is that all
God's works-including law-will praise his name. 29
In Cochran's case, boldness about the importance of what Scripture has
to say is paired with appropriate modesty about our ability to understand its
implications. Cochran's modesty is founded both in an awareness of evangelical biblical interpretation's indebtedness to tradition as well as in his insistence on seeing the juridical task within the larger biblical narrative. In this
respect, Cochran's approach to biblical authority is in line with the classical
Reformation. Consider these notes from the introduction to Law and the Bi-

ble:
We fear that some Christians, on all points of the political spectrum,
cherry-pick verses of Scripture to justify already-existing political
opinions.. . . Reading Scripture in both its immediate context and
the context of all of Scripture will help to avoid such abuse. Ultimately, of course, by being attentive to all of Scripture we are attentive to God himself, who speaks in and through the Scriptures, judges
our faulty assumptions and unbelieving propensities, and gives us

MERCY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 13 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & David VanDrunen eds., 2013) [hereinafter LAW AND THE BIBLE] (quotingPsalm 19:7-10).

28. As will be seen, Professor Cochran regularly works with co-authors and editors. While I have
identified co-authors and editors in the text and notes, given the focus of this Essay, after the initial
reference, I will present the relevant ideas as Professor Cochran's for the sake of simplicity. In this
instance, for example, the work referred to was jointly authored by Professors Cochran and
VanDrunen.

29. Id. at 14.

240

[Vol. 47: 231, 2020]

EcumenicalEvangelical Legal Thought
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

greater insight into what all of life, including law, should be. 3 0
Cochran is not prepared to accept a Christian account of law that simply
reduces divine revelation (whether in Scripture or though natural law) to a set
of abstract principles appropriate for application by civil authorities. 31 While
he does not deny the significance of divine commands, he sees the heart of the
matter as attempting to situate the legal scholar's calling (or that of the judge
or lawyer) in the context of the larger narrative of Scripture-i.e., the parts of
the Bible that do not take the form of precepts and that answer the basic questions-humans must ask: "[W]hat [was I] put on earth to do, and what [could
it] mean that I was put on earth to do it?" 3 2 Central to that narrative in
Cochran's account are (i) the kingdom of God, (ii) love, and (iii) sin.
For Cochran, the central feature of the biblical narrative is the kingdom
of God, which is found wherever Christ is loved and obeyed. 33 Even though
the kingdom is a matter of obedience, it is not merely a matter of following
laws. Cochran and his co-author Dallas Willard note "the ambiguous nature
of Jesus' relationship to law" 34 suggested in passages like John 1:17: "[T]he
law indeed was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus
Christ." 35 Law alone is not enough; grace and truth are needed if the law is to
be understood rightly, much less obeyed. Furthermore, grace and truth are
gifts found in Jesus and, by extension, in the renewed hearts and minds of
those who follow him: "Law is valuable, but it needs to be understood in light
of the teaching of the kingdom of God that the condition of the heart is primary."

36

30. Id. at 15. It is worth noting that some contemporary evangelicals adopt an understanding of
sola scripturathat is at odds with the understanding of the classical Reformation. See KEITH A.
MATHISON, THE SHAPE OF SOLA SCRIPTURA 237-53 (2001) (contrasting the Reformation understand-

ing with a modem evangelical misunderstanding Mathison designates as "solo" scriptura, which divorces the reading of Scripture from the historic creeds of the church and biblical structures of church
authority).
31. See LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 15.
32. 1 OLIVER O'DONOVAN, SELF, WORLD, AND TIME: ETHICS AS THEOLOGY, at ix (2013).
33. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Dallas Willard, The Kingdom of God, Law, and the Heart, in LAW
AND THE BIBLE, supranote 27, at 156-57.

34. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 152. Again, much of the discussion in this section is
taken from this jointly authored work. This is not to minimize Professor Willard's contributions to
the paper in question or, more importantly, his influence on Professor Cochran, who revered him as a
friend and mentor.
35. John 1:17 (New Revised Standard Version).
36. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 160.
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Cochran notes that when Jesus speaks of law, depending on the context,
he might have in mind either the "Roman law, the Mosaic law as originally
given by Moses, [or] the Mosaic law as expanded and interpreted by the Jewish tradition of Jesus' day." 37 Jesus's reaction in encounters with the civil law
and with then-current interpretations of Mosaic law included defiance, obedience, praise, criticism, reinterpretation, and affirmation. 38 His "most striking
response to law in his culture was to challenge it as a distorted expression of
God's moral law and of life in God's kingdom ."39 As prophet, Jesus observed
that the law of his day "had forgotten its purpose, [and] served itself and its
experts, rather than the people." 0
Jesus's focus on the heart carries consequences for understanding, and
living under, the various genres of law. The Sermon on the Mount is the chosen starting point. Here, Jesus
contrasted the Jewish legal code with his heart-based kingdom. The
Jewish law prohibited murder, but Jesus called the citizens of this
new kingdom not to even be angry. . . . The Jewish law required
oaths in some contexts, but Jesus prohibited oaths and taught that his
followers' word should be binding in all contexts. The Jewish law
imposed reciprocal penalties . . . but Jesus called the citizens of his
new kingdom not to respond to violence in kind and to love their enemies. Compliance with these startling, seemingly impossible commands required (and requires) a change of heart. 1
This change of heart cannot simply be summoned up from within oneself.
For Cochran the evangelical, it is supplied by the new birth, the fulfillment of
God's promise through the prophet Jeremiah to "put my law in their minds
and write it on their hearts." 4 2 The gift of divine regeneration of the heart
could "generate a far more radical change than human law could
bring.... [It] would cause someone to want to do the good, in most cases
automatically to do the good." 4 3 Evil deeds likewise come from the human

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

242

Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
Jeremiah 31:33 (quoted in Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 155).
Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 156-57.
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heart; the disordered loves that come naturally to each of us in our fallen state
lead us to choose wrongly and to disregard the love we ought to have for God
and for our neighbor. 4 If the root problem is not addressed, the symptoms
will inevitably persist.
What implications has this analysis for the contemporary lawyer or legal
scholar? Cochran argues that those whose hearts have been transformed "will
be far more likely to comply with most aspects of law" and "will go beyond
the requirements of law," that "a changed heart will lead one to be greatly
concerned with justice."45
In the current moment, with the deficiencies of the contemporary evangelical church so clearly on display, this may seem like far too rosy an assessment. One might wonder whether the evidence belies the claim for Cochran's
much-vaunted transformation of the heart, especially when it comes to law
and politics. Indeed, the belief in the new birth seems easily translatable into
a belief in the believer's moral superiority, and the glib supposition that everything would be okay "if only people like us were in charge. "46
Investigating that charge in a systematic way would take us well beyond
the scope of this project, but Cochran is sensitive to the objection. To begin
with, he does not associate conversion with an automatically changed heart.
In a genuine conversion, which consists of repentance and faith, the seeds of
change are present. Nevertheless, the heart change that starts "may not get
much farther." 4 7 Moreover, he singles out Jesus's teaching about the centrality of the heart as "a check on his modem followers who might want a political
or military kingdom . . .. [T]he kingdom does not come through law."4 8 Finally, he challenges a too-easy identification of the Gospel with contemporary
political agendas. Our problem is not, for example, either that we have too
much government regulation or too little governmental intervention; by
Cochran's lights, we may have both problems at the same time: "Law should

44. For an exploration of these Augustinian themes in the context of justice and law, see Charles
Mathewes, "Be Instructed, All You Who Judge the Earth":Law, Justice, and Love During the World,
in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW: How MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? 166 (Robert F. Cochran,

Jr. & Zachary R. Calo eds., 2017).
45. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 157; see also id. ("Justice alone will never do justice to
justice, but a heart of love will promote and require justice (and much more).").
46. This particular manifestation of self-righteousness seems endemic to virtually all the participants in our current political moment, religious or secular.
47. Email from Robert F. Cochran, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Univ., to William S. Brewbaker
III, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala. (Aug. 17, 2019) (on file with author).
48. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 157.
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serve human good. It can miss that objective when it is either so consumed
with details that it loses sight of people or so weak that it fails to protect
them." 4 9
On the other hand, in the administration of law, character counts: "A cruel
or irrational judge, prosecutor[,] or policeman can have a devastating effect
upon public and private well-being and righteousness. Who better than a person living with Christ in Christ's kingdom to administer law in a just manner?" 0 The phrase living with Christin Christ's kingdom no doubt bears emphasis in Cochran's formulation, and the connection with love proves crucial.
Jesus's followers were "to love broadly . . . to love neighbors, Samaritans[,]
and enemies."" Although he does not discuss it, Jesus' presentation of the
final judgment in Matthew 25 in terms of the "sheep" whose faith was evidenced by love and mercy and were welcomed into eternal life and the "goats"
who, despite professing belief, were indifferent to the needs of those around
them and were to be eternally punished. Genuine love of God and neighbor
is "the framework on which all of the law hangs ([Matthew] 22:35-40)."52
Indeed, Cochran has said that whereas most of his career has been spent reaching out beyond the evangelical community, "in this last part of my career, I
am trying to speak to the evangelical community, at a time when we seem to
have forgotten Jesus's message of agapic love, love of the Samaritan, and love
of the enemy." 53
Love, then, is central to Cochran's framework (so central in fact, that he
later organized a conference and edited a volume entitled Agape, Justice, and
Law, dedicated entirely to examining love's role in Christian thought about
law).54 Law, it turns out, is simply one more way of loving one's neighbor:
"Love can be reflected in laws as dramatic as those prohibiting murder and
those ensuring that criminal defendants have fair trials to laws as seemingly

49. Id. at 161.
50. Id. at 164. He also quotes Augustine, stating, "[The rule of Christians] is beneficial, not so
much for themselves as for their subjects." See id. (alteration in original) (quoting AUGUSTINE, THE
CITY OF GOD 88 (Gerard G. Walsh trans., Doubleday ed., 1958)).
51. Id. at 164.
52. Id.
53. Email from Robert F. Cochran, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Univ., to William S. Brewbaker
III, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala. (Aug. 18, 2019) (on file with author).
54. See AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW, supra note 44; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Jesus and the
Mosaic Law: Agapic Love as the Foundation and Objective ofLaw, TOURO L. REV. (forthcoming

2020).
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mundane as those prohibiting drivers from double parking."" Critically, human law has only instrumental value; it is intended to serve the larger interest
of human flourishing.5 6 Another implication of love as the framework for law
is a concern for the most vulnerable members of society. Cochran does not
assume that this leads to a politics of Christian socialism, but he does "suspect
that [Jesus] would affirm the Catholic teaching that laws . . . should be evaluated first based on their impact on the poor."5 7 Moreover, genuine concern
for the poor requires attention not only to the provisions of the laws on the
books, but also to its administration.
Not only that, loving one's neighbors is not limited to protecting them
from economic oppression, undeserved misfortune, or bureaucratic indifference. Law also has a role in shaping virtuous character in the name of love:
"Law can and must reinforce the practices of the good."5 9 This was a good
effect, he argues, of the Old Testament laws that protected the poor. Although
there are limits to their character-building capacities, laws requiring farmers
to permit poor people to glean from their fields, for example, ingrain generosity and love for the poor as habitual behavior.6 0
A final significant feature of Cochran's Christian narrative is the fact of
sin. According to the Christian story, the default condition of every human
heart is one of deceit and rebellion against God. We are all sinners in need of
grace, and this has a number of implications for our legal practices. Those
who make and administer law are no less in need of grace and forgiveness
than are offenders. They are obligated to love their enemies as well as their
friends, and are to administer justice recognizing their kinship with the offender, not as though the offender were "bad" and the judge "good." 6 1 Moreover, Christian punishment is never revenge born out of "hatred or vindictive
"612
passions.
Although the fact of civil law is often attributed to the presence of sin in
55. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 165.
56. See id. at 166 (quoting Mark 2:27) ("The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath."); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Jesus, Agape, and Law, in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW, supra

note 44, at 22-28.
57. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 167.
58. See Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 167-68; see also Cochran, supra note 58, at 28-34.
59. Id. at 169.
60. See id. at 169.
61. Id. at 170; see also id. at 174 (endorsing the traditional formulation "justice tempered with
mercy"); Cochran, supra note 58, at 14-15 (discussing the parable of the Good Samaritan).
62. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 170 (quoting Jeffrie Murphy).

245

[Vol. 47: 231, 2020]

EcumenicalEvangelical Legal Thought
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the world, the content of law is also affected. It is not just a question of law's
identifying a locus of serious human rebellion, then specifying the correct
moral standard and penalizing deviation from it. Here, Cochran emphasizes
Jesus' teaching on the Mosaic law of divorce in Matthew 19.63 Jesus teaches
that Moses allowed divorce "because your hearts were hard." In other words,
"Jesus approved of civil law that explicitly permitted and even identified the
procedures for deviations from God's moral law" in view of the harsh consequences that would otherwise ensue.6 4 Cochran sees this insight as a potential
lens through which other Old Testament laws might be read,6 5 as well as a
model for contemporary judges and legislators, who should "prudently and
creatively craft laws with eyes fixed both on God's moral law and on practical
reality." 6 6
A final lesson Cochran draws from the biblical narrative with respect to
law is the need for humility. Employing the story of Jesus's encounter with a
woman caught in adultery as a final case study, he suggests a number of possible insights that could be (and have been) taken from the story. These include the priority of the heart in assessing one's own motives in law enforcement, injustice in the administration of the law, mercy, the appropriateness of
Christian participation in civil government, Jesus' fulfillment of the law's
penalty in his own body, and abolition of the death penalty. In a fitting conclusion to the essay, Cochran and his co-author confess their inability to offer
a definitive interpretation:
We wish we could tell you which, if any, of the above lessons Jesus
63. Matthew 19:3-9 states:
And Pharisees came up to him and tested him by asking, "Is it lawful to divorce one's wife
for any cause?" He answered, "Have you not read that he who created them from the
beginning made them male and female, and said, 'Therefore a man shall leave his father
and his mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh'? So they are
no longer two but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate."
They said to him, "Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce and
to send her away?" He said to them, "Because of your hardness of heart Moses allowed
you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you: whoever
divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another, commits adultery.
Id. (quoting Genesis 1:27, 2:24).
64. Cochran & Willard, supra note 33, at 175 (quoting Aquinas on the need for distinction between
legal and moral standards).
65. Including permitting slavery and sanctioning the death penalty for parental disrespect and homosexual conduct. See id. at 177.
66. See id. at 179 (citing proposals to modify divorce law as examples of appropriately creative
ways of honoring moral standards in a realistic way).
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intended to teach us in his encounter with the woman caught in adultery. Jesus does not always explain everything. We hesitate to make
things clear where Jesus seems intentionally to have left them unclear. We leave the interpretation of this story to you, as Jesus did.6 7
B.

Legal Theory, Theology and Law: Cochran as Ecumenical
1.

Ecumenical Legal Theory

One of Professor Cochran's most visible early forays into the area of
Christian legal thought was a symposium entitled "Christian Perspectives on
Law and Legal Scholarship," which he persuaded the Journalof Legal Education to include in its March 1997 issue.6 8 The symposium, with contributions from Gerard V. Bradley, David S. Caudill, and David M. Smolin, featured short articles on Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, and Anabaptist
perspectives on law.6 9 Professor Cochran's introduction to the symposium is
instructive for present purposes because he introduces categories that he
would continue to use in later years.
Postmodernism was an influential and relatively new movement in legal
thought in the 1990s, and Cochran, no doubt partly in order to attempt to find
some common ground with an audience that he rightly would have expected
to be skeptical, offers a surprisingly "postmodem" 70 account of the development of his own Christian worldview. He begins with his own story, noting
the connection between the postmodern emphasis on narrative and the tradition of personal testimony in his evangelical heritage.7 1

67.
68.
EDUC.
69.

See id. at 182.
See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ChristianPerspectiveson Law and Legal Scholarship, 47 J. LEGAL
1 (1997).
Id.

70. I use the scare quotes because postmodernism represents a family of theories that bear some
resemblances to each other rather than a school of thought with recognizable principles. See JEANFRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: AREPORT ON KNOWLEDGE, at xxiv (Geoff Ben-

nington & Brian Massumi trans., 1993) (defining postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives"). Assuming that Lyotard's famous definition is describing something central to the postmodern
turn, the definition itself shows the difficulty. It is difficult to conceive of incredulity toward metanarratives as something other than a metanarrative.
71. Cochran, supra note 68, at 1. Narratives remained important in Cochran's scholarship. See,
e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspirationfor "The Honorable Profession": The
Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 (2000); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession,
and the Counselor-at-Law:Lessonsfrom Dostoevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1998).
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It is worth stopping and observing Cochran's approach to engagement
with the wider legal academy. First and foremost, the symposium itself illustrates Professor Cochran's view that Christian legal scholars should engage in
ongoing conversations within the legal academy, rather than write about law
(a) as if Christianity had nothing to add to those conversations, or (b) as if
Christians could gain no insights about law or life from secular scholars. 72
The fact of the symposium was reflective of the first claim; Cochran's introduction, highlighting, as it does, points of commonality with secular scholars,
73
reflects the second.
Cochran next opposes postmodernism to what he calls, appropriately
enough, "enlightenment liberalism." Although, like postmodernism, liberalism is a family of theories, Cochran has in mind the foundationalist aspect of
the liberal tradition:
Enlightenment liberalism asserts that it starts with observable data
and assumptions that every reasonable person would share and constructs its view of reality by reason alone. Science is its model of
knowledge. Everything is reduced to a science; law, as an academic
74
discipline, is one of the social sciences.
Cochran is no foundationalist; the "raw bits of intellectual material" with
which he starts consists both of "observations I make of the world around me"
and "prerational assumptions . . . that I take on faith, some of which I learned
growing up in my home and church, and some of which I learned in the largely
secular schools I attended."75 Interestingly, Cochran traces his (critical realist)
76
anti-foundationalism both to "the postmoderns" and the Dutch Calvinists.
"Enlightenment liberalism's faith in individualism, rationalism, autonomy
and scientific naturalism," he writes, "is just that, faith-faith that may or may
72. An alternative approach is to attempt to construct Christian perspectives on law that strive to
be entirely universal and that are typically presented without any acknowledged engagement with
extrabiblical sources. See, e.g., Roger Bem,A BiblicalModelfor Analysis ofIssues ofLaw and Public
Policy: With IllustrativeApplications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and Public Policy Issues, 6

REGENT U. L. REV. 103 (1995). The cited source is more indebted to modernism than the author seems
to be aware. See generally NOLL, supra note 9.

73. These features of Cochran's work are reflected in his work as a movement-builder, discussed
infra Part V.

74. Cochran, supra note 68, at 2.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, A CalvinistPerspective on Faithin Legal Scholarship, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 19 (1997).
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not be justified." 7 7
This observation has more than abstract importance. As Oliver O'Donovan has observed, "[E]pistemology is a function of political theory. "78
Those who would silence religious discourse about law appeal to the irrationality of such discourse, but if there is no gold standard for rationality, and
everyone relies on prerational assumptions to some degree, then it is much
harder to exclude religious speech about law out of hand. 79 Cochran again
offers a narrative to buttress inclusion of diverse voices in legal discourse: he
recounts entering the legal academy when "enlightenment liberalism" was the
hegemonic discourse and remarks that "to be accepted in academic circles and
to be true to my view of reality," would have required him to restrict his thinking to the zone of overlap between his worldview and enlightenment liberal
dogma. 0 He worried that he would write things he didn't believe in order to
achieve professional success and that his intellectual understanding of the
parts of his faith that didn't square with such dogma would wither away from
disuse."
Cochran recognizes that the legal academy, then as now, includes scholars with wildly differing worldviews, and that "[i]f the only scholarship were
based on common assumptions, there would be little to write about."8 2 And
yet he notes that there may be wide areas of agreement between scholars with
differing assumptions about fundamental realities. 8 3 We can still learn from
each other: "The best scholars are also considering the viewpoints of others.
They are discovering odd combinations of shared beliefs, as well as disagreement, between various groups. Some who start from very different assumptions ultimately reach some of the same conclusions."8

77. Cochran, supra note 68, at 3 (emphasis in original) (citing THOmAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92-110 (2d ed. 1970); and then ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988)).
78. See OLIVER O'DONOVAN, RESURRECTION AND MORAL ORDER: AN OUTLINE FOR
EVANGELICAL ETHICS 86 (2d ed. 1994).
79. For a more extended discussion of the reasons religious speech should be admitted into legal
discourse, see CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at xxii.
80. Cochran, supra note 68, at 2.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. ("Examples are the similar conclusions on lawyer advocacy, pornography, and the nature
of morality that some feminists and Christians have reached.").
84. Id.
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2.

Ecumenical Theology

Cochran's recognition of apparently intractable difference when it comes
to starting points, and, at the same time, his optimism about the possibility of
finding common ground in unlikely places, seems also to have led him to a
welcoming approach toward intellectual collaboration across theological
lines. This is evident, of course, in the "Christian Perspectives on Law and
Legal Scholarship" symposium itself, with its treatment of Catholic, Calvinist,
Anabaptist, and Lutheran viewpoints on law, and, as we will see later, it is
also quite evident in Cochran's work as a conference organizer and movement

builder.
Perhaps this is not so remarkable. After all, nothing in Cochran's position
as outlined above requires anyone to change her mind about her own most
cherished beliefs. Still, and as noted above, Cochran assumes that one's beliefs are likely to change at least in spots, and, perhaps dramatically, through
encounters with others.8 5
In a landmark book written in the 1950s, H. Richard Niebuhr developed
a taxonomy that grouped theologians and Christian traditions according to
their attitudes about involvement in cultural matters.8 6 Niebuhr's taxonomy
is still in use today, even if it is heavily criticized in some quarters. 7 His five
groupings include synthesists, conversionists, separatists, dualists, and culturalists (the distinctive features of each group are explained briefly below).
Professor Cochran employs these categories to bring order to the diverse theological contributions in the 1997 symposium mentioned above.8 9 I will use

85. Cochran's introduction uses the image of a cone to represent a person's worldview. He describes his experience: "At times the cone grows, as I gain insight-or, at least, think I gain insight.
At times the cone shrinks, as I reconsider and reject earlier conclusions, as I determine that aspects of
my view of reality do not fit with reality. In fact, a cone is a very inadequate picture: a better picture
would have irregularly shaped limbs growing out (and shrinking) at all sorts of odd places." Cochran,
supra note 68, at 2.
86. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951).

87. As Cochran notes, two prominent separationists criticize Niebuhr's categories for implicitly
suggesting that "Christians are in an all-or-nothing relationship to the culture; that we must responsibly
choose to be 'all,' or irresponsibly choose to be sectarian nothing." See Cochran,supra note 68, at 8
(quoting STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: LIFE IN THE CHRISTIAN

COLONY 38 (1989)).
88. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at xliii.

89. Cochran uses the categories again in one of his contributions to ChristianPerspectives on Legal Thought. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Traditions, Culture, and Law, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at 242, 250.
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three of the five categories9 0 to describe elements of Cochran's own work,
taking up the question of how his work can reflect so many of these viewpoints
coherently in the conclusion of this Essay.
a.

Cochran the Synthesist

In Niebuhr's taxonomy, the synthesist theologian begins with the idea that
human culture is an affirmative good-that reason and creation, like revelation, are from God. 91 The knowledge creation and reason give is incomplete,
but it can be improved and augmented with theological truths. For Niebuhr,
the primary exemplar of this point of view is Thomas Aquinas, whose
system of thought . .. combined without confusing philosophy and
theology, state and church, civic and Christian virtues, natural and
divine laws, Christ and culture. Out of these various elements he built
a great structure of theoretical and practical wisdom, which like a cathedral was solidly planted among the streets and marketplaces, the
houses, palaces and universities that represent human culture, but
which, when one had passed through its doors, presented a strange
new world of quiet spaciousness, of sounds and colors, actions and
figures, symbolic of a life beyond all secular concerns. . . . Like
Schleiermacher later, he spoke to the cultured among the despisers of
Christian faith . .. [b]ut with a Tertullian he acknowledged that what
9 2
was hidden to the wise was revealed to babies.
Cochran's synthetic approach is most obviously on display in his regular
interactions with Catholic legal thought, which tends to be synthesist.9 3 Indeed, much of Cochran's approach to the relevance of Scripture to modem
civil law bears a strong family resemblance to what Aquinas has to say in the

90. I leave aside Niebuhr's dualist and culturalist categories. Cochran largely rejects these approaches. See Cochran, supra note 68, at 10 (describing the failure of the Journal ofLegalEducation
symposium to include a culturalist perspective as "just as well"); Cochran & Willard, supra note 33,
at 173 (rejecting "two-kingdoms" approach to the Sermon on the Mount).
91. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 130.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supranote 20, at 486; RobertF. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and EvangelicalSupreme Court
Justices: A TheologicalAnalysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296 (2006).
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Treatise on Law.9 4 Like Aquinas, Cochran affirms natural law but likewise
affirms that not every moral precept is to be written into the civil law.9 5 He
recognizes that legal codes must vary according to the circumstances of the
people who must live under them.9 6 He accepts that studying the laws in the
Old Testament may provide insight but at the same time understands that those
laws were given to a specific people under specific circumstances and should
not be assumed applicable to modem conditions.9 7 Neither the Bible nor natural law answers every question lawyers might want to ask, much less in detail. Cochran thus summarizes the Christian legal scholar's task as follows:
With the moral foundation revealed in nature, and confirmed and
clarified in Scripture, Christians must use godly wisdom and prudence to seek to understand the world in which they live and the social circumstances in which particular problems arise. They must apply the norms of Scripture and natural law in ways that produce just
and beneficial results for their fellow human beings. 98
b.

Cochran the Separatist

Niebuhr describes the separatist position as "one that uncompromisingly
affirms the sole authority of Christ over the Christian and resolutely rejects
culture's claims to loyalty." 9 9 On this view, "[t]he counterpart of loyalty to
Christ and the [Christian community] is the rejection of cultural society; a
clear line of separation is drawn between the brotherhood of the children of
God and the world." 00 Separatists expect that the believer who involves herself in government or the military will often find herself on the wrong side of
the line of separation.10 1 The churches in the Anabaptist tradition, e.g., the
Mennonites and Amish, provide the most obvious contemporary examples.
Given the separatist's emphasis on the difference between Christian and

94. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Iallae 90-108.
95. LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 15.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 18. This approach's emphasis on Scripture and lack of explicit reference to church tradition gives it a Reformation accent, but the approach is nonetheless fairly characterized as a catholic
(with a small "c") Christian approach.
99. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 45.
100. LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27, at 47-48.

101. Id. at 54-82.
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secular communities, one would not expect to see much evidence of separatist
thought in legal scholarship. 10 2 If the realm of law and politics is off limits to
the Christian, why spend much time thinking about it? In fact, however, Anabaptist thought has been surprisingly influential in contemporary legal scholarship. Two of the most influential Anabaptist thinkers writing about the law
have been Stanley Hauerwas 10 3 and Professor Cochran's mentor and co-author, Thomas Shaffer. Interestingly, neither one of these scholars is part of an
Anabaptist community, 04 but both are keen to emphasize the disjunction between the ethics of the Kingdom and that of "the world." 0 5
Perhaps the Anabaptist presence in the world of legal and political
thought is not so surprising. Anabaptists do not believe that the Christian faith
is irrelevant to politics, or that there is no political role for Christians; rather,
"the political task of Christians is to be the church rather than to transform the
world." 1 0 6 The presence of an alternative community may influence the dominant community's politics and its law, even where that influence is not ac-

tively sought. 107
Augustine's contrast between the city of God and the worldly city is an
important image in separationist thought. The hearts of those in the worldly
city are set on the wrong things, and the resulting systems of ethics and politics
inevitably reflect these misplaced loves. The apparent virtues of ancient
Rome are, for example, in the end, merely "splendid vices," which the Gospel
exposes as inconsistent with true love of God and neighbor.108 The ethics of
those in power may have the appearance of goodness but be inimical to the
true values of the Kingdom. Not surprisingly, some critical legal theorists
have found in Augustine and his critique of Rome a genial source of authority
in their own critiques of the American legal system.10 9

102. Id. at 47-48.
103. See generally Symposium, Theological Argument in Law: Engaging with Stanley Hauerwas,
75 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-251 (2012).

104. Hauerwas is a United Methodist and Shaffer was a Catholic.
105. See 1 John 2:15 ("Do not love the world.").
106. See HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 87, at 38 (1989); Cochran, supranote 68, at 8 n.25.
107. See JOHN HOWARD YODER, On Not Being in Charge, in THE JEWISH-CHRISTIAN SCHISM

REVISITED 168, 168-75 (Michael G. Cartwright & Peter Ochs eds., 2003).
108. This very Augustinian statement was apparently never made by Augustine himself. See T.H.
Irwin, Splendid Vices? Augustine For and Against Pagan Virtues, 8 MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY & PHIL.
105, 106 (1999). But see generally AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. 19 (Gerard G. Walsh trans.,

Doubleday ed., 1958).
109. See, e.g., ElizabethMensch, Cain'sLaw, 36 PEPP.L.REV. 541, 542-43 (2009).
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One does not have to look far to find elements of Cochran's thought that
are, though never fully separatist, at least quite critical of prevailing "worldly"
thought. Consider his critique of the cultural norm of professionalism. 110
Far from defending professionalism as a dominant legal/cultural norm
that had been taken to guide legal ethics, Cochran's critique of professionalism takes the ideal to task on economic, cultural, sociological, and ethical
grounds. His opening salvo takes aim at then-recent remarks from the presidents of both the American Bar Association and the Association of American
Law Schools, accusing them (indirectly) of using professionalism "almost as
a mantra, a word which if repeated often enough will release mystical moral
power" but which, alas, "no longer seems to inspire."' Traditional conceptions of professionalism, he argues, had religious origins that no longer have
much influence in the legal profession. 112 In the United States, professional
ethics became merely the ethics of the aristocracy and "of gentlemen-the
1 13
generic, Judeo-Christian ethics of the upper-class churches."
Cochran provides a number of reasons for the demise of the consensusthe opening of bar membership to outsiders "despite the resistance of the bar's
professional elites,""' the development of a more egalitarian moral sense in
the children of the upper class beginning in the 1960s," and moral relativism
116
reinforced by postmodern skepticism of universally accessible moral truth.
And the news gets worse-attempts to establish a "new professionalism" are
not only unlikely to be successful, they are affirmatively dangerous. 1 17 "My
concern," he warns, "is not only that the new professionalism will fail to inspire lawyers to virtue, but that it will inspire them to vice.""'
Cochran identifies the "new professionalism" with a number of disparate
themes- a claim to expertise that justified protection of lawyers from market

110. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalismin the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts
at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 305
(2000).
111. Id. at 305.

112. Id. at 305-09.
113. Id. at 307. Such a critique fits well with the skeptical attitude of the separationist tradition
toward powerful institutions, whether religious or otherwise. The ethics of the upper-class churches,
it is suggested, have been taken captive by worldly norms rather than those of the Gospel.
114. See Cochran, supra note 110, at 308.
115. Id. at 310.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 311.
118. Id.
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accountability,119 an ethic of role morality that serves client autonomy, 12 0 and
paternalism toward the client, either in the traditional form of giving moral
direction to the client, or in the more modern form of assuming an obligation
to pursue the client's selfish ends at all costs, with little consultation of the
client in the process.121 The result of this hodgepodge of understandings of
the concept of professionalism, according to Cochran, has been self-regulation
that served lawyers at least as well as it served the public, 122 protection of the
autonomy of the wealthy (who can afford lawyers) at the expense of the poor
(who cannot), 12 3 imposition of the lawyer's moral code on their clients, and a
system that encourages clients to disregard the interests of others. 12 4
These concepts of professionalism are, for Cochran, "both too weak and
too dangerous to yield the responsible exercise of professional power." 125
Cochran's proposed solution is surprising: "[M]oral development," he writes,
"comes primarily from within communities." 126 As a result, "we should encourage these communities to develop moralities (and theologies) of lawyering." 127 Even if these moralities of lawyering will not transform the profession
as a whole, they may affect the practice of significant numbers of lawyers. 128
Cochran anticipates the obvious objection that the law is a public profession, and his proposal seems to invite individual lawyers to practice law according to values that are merely personal. 12 9 He has, of course, already noted
that there is no universally accepted norm for the lawyer's role; indeed, that
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 314. He continues:
Other existing sources of lawyer guidance have their shortcomings as well. The market
generates high quality legal services for savvy, wealthy clients, but gives little aid to the
poor and middle-class and tends to exacerbate the problems of lawyer advocacy as lawyers
focus solely on the interests of their wealthy clients. The rules of the profession and legal
malpractice rules set minimum standards for lawyers, but law can only do so much. It is
impossible to require the virtues that the legal profession needs and excessive regulation
can undercut the possibility of developing those virtues.
See id. at 311.
126. See id. at 314.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 314-15.
129. See id. at 315 ("[I] have little faith that the person, acting alone, will come up with values,
professional or otherwise, that are worth living by.").

255

[Vol. 47: 231, 2020]

EcumenicalEvangelical Legal Thought
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

is a big part of the problem facing the "new professionalism." 130 Professional
values "have little power to inspire." 13 1 The values of virtue-shaping communities not only have the capacity to inspire their adherents, but, Cochran argues, they cannot be dismissed as merely personal: "They draw on memories,
stories, virtues, and rules that have their source beyond living memory; they
have evolved over long periods of time, based on the wisdom of many that
have gone before." 132
Interestingly, Cochran's proposal contains elements of both the synthesist
and separatist positions described above, and also the conversionist perspective discussed next. 13 3 Community values are cultural values, and he will later
suggest that "as we go deeper into our particularities, we find commonalities." 134 Something like natural law is evident, he argues, when we encounter
the needs of the poor, and groups with diverse accounts of human meaning
largely agree on the need for an account of law practice with greater space for
recognizably humane values. 135 The proposal has separatist overtones in its
focus on the embodied ethics of particular communities and its resistance of
the idea of shared civic principles of morality. 136 At the same time, it lacks
the sense of disengagement from the larger culture associated with separatist
Christian traditions. 137

130. See id. at 310-14. "The [legal] profession gave up on defining the good lawyer; the Model
Rules defined only the bad lawyer. Attempts to establish a new professionalism face a similar prospect." Id. at 310.
131. Id. at 315.
132. Id. Cochran contrasts the power of the ABA Model Rule's admonition that lawyers provide at
least fifty hours of pro bono service per year to inspire lawyers to serve the poor with Jesus' famous
picture of the last judgment in Matthew 25:34-46. Cochran, supra note 110, at 316-17.
133. For a discussion of the synthesis and separatist positions, see supra Sections III.B.2(a)-(b).
For a discussion of the conversionist position, see infra Section III.B.2(c). Cochran's proposal is
arguably conversionist in that he seems to be suggesting that the Christian revelation can serve as a
corrective force to reigning conceptions of professional ethics. See infra Section III.B.2(c).
134. Cochran, supra note 110, at 320 (suggesting this was the viewpoint of Martin Luther King,
Jr.).

135. See id. at 318-19.
136. See supra Section III.B.2(a) (explaining that the separatist's task is to focus on preserving the
Christian community as an alternative to the dominant community).
137. Compare Cochran, supra note 110, at 315 (suggesting that communal religious traditions that
have "evolved over long periods of time" are "resources that their members should look to, explore,
critique, and draw from"), with NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 47-48 (explaining that separatism is the
"rejection of cultural society" such that a "a clear line of separation is drawn between the brotherhood
of the children of God and the world").
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c.

Cochran the Conversionist

In Niebuhr's typology, conversionists resemble dualists 1 38 in terms of the
seriousness with which they take human sin and its effects on culture. Both
believe that sin "is deeply rooted in the human soul, that it pervades all man's
work" and "all cultural work in which men promote their own glory, whether
individualistically or socially . . . lies under the judgment of God." 139 Even
so, conversionists bring a "more positive and hopeful attitude" to their cultural
engagement.140 This optimism is based on a sense that God, as Creator, remains sovereign over, concerned with, and engaged with his creation: "The
Word that became flesh and dwelt among us, the Son who does the work of
the Father in the world of creation, has entered into a human culture that has
never been without his ordering action."" Contrary to the separatist position,
the conversionist believes Christ's redemption provides hope, not just for the
14 2
individual and the church, but for culture as well.
As we have seen, Cochran's work includes elements of both the synthesist
and separatist positions. 14 3 Even so, the conversionist approach to the relation
and culture marks him most strongly. In addition to his work in theology and
jurisprudence, Professor Cochran also dedicated a large portion of his scholarly energies to the field of professional ethics." As examined in the next
part, Cochran is nothing if not a reformer when it comes to legal ethics, not
only proposing that Christian lawyers conduct their practices in specific ways
that would put them at odds with conventional legal approaches (admonitions
that might sit easily with a separatist view), but also proposing reforms to the

138. Niebuhr's dualists, according to Cochran, generally see culture as "necessarily fallen and unredeemable, but ... believe[] that Christians appropriately play a role within it." See Cochran,supra
note 68, at 9 (using Martin Luther King, Jr. as a main example of a dualist).
139. NIEBUHR, supra note 86, at 191.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 195-96.
See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.

144. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Ethics and CollaborativePracticeEthics, 38 HOFSTRA

L. REV. 537, 538 (2010) (describing the "legal and ethical standards" under which professionals engage in Collaborative Practice-a new process for resolving legal disputes-in the United States);
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Thomas L. Shaffer, "Technical" Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer
as Friend, 14 CLINICAL L. REv. 337, 337-53 (2007) [hereinafter Cochran & Shaffer, "Technical"

Defenses] (suggesting that lawyer-client counseling on the issue of "technical" defenses, such as statute of limitations defenses, raises moral issues "worthy of dialogue").
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secular rules that govern all lawyers' practice and sanctions for their disobedience, in some cases from professional disciplinary bodies, and in others, by
tort sanctions.14
IV. THE LAWYER AS DISCIPLE AND FRIEND: COCHRAN'S LEGAL ETHICS
The starting point of Cochran's legal ethics is arguably a model of lawyerclient relations that he and Thomas Shaffer first developed in their 1994 book
Lawyers, Clients, andMoralResponsibility.14 6 Their model relied heavily on
arguments developed by Shaffer in previous writings.1 7 The model proceeds
upon two moral premises that would be unremarkable in ordinary life, but
seem almost shocking when applied to lawyer-client relationships."' These
premises are (1) that moral agents (and those who advise them) ought to consider the effects of their choices on other people;1 4 9 and (2) that moral agents
(and those who advise them) ought to respect each other in the process of
moral deliberation.15 0 An important feature of the model is its assumption that
decisions taken in the course of legal representation are best understood as
joint decisions-decisions for which both the lawyer and the client bear some
degree of responsibility and authority. 5
Cochran and Shaffer apply these principles in both constructive and critical ways to address two common questions that arise in legal ethics: Who
controls the decisions being made in the course of legal representation? And,
should the interests of people other than the client be considered?15 2 It is pre-

145. See infra Part IV.
146. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 113-34 (1994).
147. See, e.g., SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN, supra note 20; Shaffer, supra note 20.
148. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 1-2.

149. See id. at 1 ("[A]lmost all decisions made in the law office will benefit some people at the
expense of others.").
150. Id. at 2 ("If the law becomes the only limitation on human action, the state will either leave
people to be uncivil toward one another, or intrude into more and more aspects of human life.").
151. See id. at 113 ("When lawyer and client together resolve issues in legal representation (as we
believe they should), lawyer and client engage in moral discourse; they engage in moral reasoning
together.").
152. Id. at 3; see also Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers as Strangers and
Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69, 69 (1995) [hereinafter

Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends]. The latter question is critical and affects
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cisely here that the ordinary moral premises noted above become controversial. 15 3 Lawyers may or may not agree about the extent to which the client's
moral views about the course of the representation should be respected-after
all, the lawyer is the expert and may or may not be willing to involve herself
in moral taint for the sake of the client's wishes."' Lawyers also may not
agree that their advice to clients ought to include concern for the effects of the
client's decisions on other people-the lawyer's job, after all, is to represent
her client!.15
Let us begin with the question of whether the lawyer and the client should
be concerned with the effects of their decisions on other people.1 5 6 Here,
Cochran takes issue with so-called "client-centered" lawyering, which, consistent with mainstream liberal political theory, makes advancing the individual autonomy of the client a guiding objective. 1 7 The supposed moral
strength of this approach to lawyering-specifically, its respect for the client's
autonomy and dignity, and its capacity to place the lawyer in an appropriately
"neutral" role in order to achieve that result-is what Cochran finds most objectionable:
The client-centered counselors claim to be neutral, but in fact, their
decision-making framework steers the client toward making selfserving choices. It imposes a regime of client autonomy-clients are
directed to make choices based on consequences to themselves. . . . The Enlightenment liberal ideal is C.S. Lewis's picture of
hell from "The Great Divorce": Autonomous people on the outskirts

Cochran's insights about issues outside professional ethics. Consider, for example, his endorsement
of restorative justice: "Whereas the primary players in the traditional American criminal justice system
are the state and the offender, restorative justice brings the victim and the community into the picture."
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The CriminalDefense Attorney: Roadblock or Bridge to Restorative Justice?,
14 J.L. & RELIGION 211, 212 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Cochran, Roadblock or Bridge].
153. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 3-4.
154. See id. at 35; Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends, supra note 152, at 69

(explaining that "[t]he lawyer as godfather controls the representation and ignores the interests of others").
155. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 7 (explaining that lawyers as advocates often

"attack other people at the behest of their clients"); Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and
Friends, supra note 152, at 69 (noting the "lawyer-as-hired gun defers to the client and ignores the
interests of others").
156. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Enlightenment Liberalism, Lawyers, and the Future ofLawyerClient Relations, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 685 (2011).

157. Id. at 686-88.
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of a city who continually move further and further away from one
another.5 8
Cochran acknowledges that in many cases, the lawyer's role in empowering the client can be a positive good.1 5 9 This is especially true when lawyers
are representing poor people against rich opponents-the rich will have plenty
of resources with which to look after their own interests.1 6 0 On the other hand,
"[i]f clients with great power make decisions based solely on 'consequences
to the client' they can cause great harm to others."1 6 1
The second critical question for Shaffer and Cochran is who controls the
decisions made during the course of the representation. 16 2 Note that this question is analytically distinct from the preceding one: a lawyer might believe
that she should pursue the client's interests alone without regard for others'
interests, and that, as the lawyer, her judgments about where those interests
lie should govern the concrete decisions that are actually made. 16 3 Or, the
lawyer might believe that every decision with moral significance ought to be
made by the client alone, with the lawyer in a more-or-less ministerial role. 164
The traditional answer to the second question places both moral and legal
decision making primarily in the hands of the lawyer: "The early American
gentleman-lawyer asserted control of legal representation based on his [assumed] superior social status, superior influence, superior intelligence, and
superior moral sensitivity." 1 6 5 Lawyer authority also protected the consciences of the lawyer and the client, lest, in the heat of battle, immoral decisions might be made.16 6 As Judge Clement Haynsworth once wrote, "[T]he
lawyer must never forget that he is the master. He is not there to do the client's
bidding. It is for the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally right[.]" 167
158. Id. at 688.
159. Id. at 689 ("In some situations, it may be that the client-centered counselors' focus on client
empowerment is justified.").
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 3.
163. See, e.g., Shaffer & Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends, supra note 152.

164. See id.
165. Cochran, supra note 156, at 689.
166. See id. at 690 ("[T]here are troubling aspects of the authoritarian approach.... There is danger
that lawyers will be confident of their moral judgment when confidence is not justified. Generally,
two consciences in conversation are more likely to get moral truth than one.").
167. See id. at 689 (quoting Clement F. Haynsworth, Professionalismin Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. REV.

627, 628 (1976)).
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Despite the emphasis on morality that underlies this model, Cochran has
little patience with it.168 Indeed, he accepts the liberal lawyer's characterization of it as "authoritarian." 1 6 9 There is no reason to believe that lawyers are,
as a group, possessed of moral insight superior to that of clients as a group. 170
Cochran believes that humility is an important lawyer virtue.1 7 1 Authoritarian
lawyering exalts lawyer expertise in a way that is "inconsistent with love of
neighbor, inconsistent with a recognition of the client as a fellow child of
[and it] robs the client of the opportunity to grow morally." 172
God[,] . .
The significance of moral development to human flourishing also informs
Cochran's reservations about the approach to lawyering that suggests that
lawyers ought to be willing to pursue their clients' interests through any lawful means, even when those means contradict the lawyer's conscience. Neutrality toward client ends proves, for Shaffer and Cochran, an illusory basis
for justifying immoral acts. 17 3 Failure to stand up to immoral conduct is itself
a moral choice, and one that does lasting damage to the lawyer:
Morality is a skill like other skills; it is something that we learn by
doing. As we address problems morally, we develop the capacity to
deal morally with other problems. If moral sensitivity has no place in
lawyers' daily lives, they run the risk that their moral sensitivity will
atrophy.1 7 4
The foregoing critique of conventional approaches to the lawyer-client
relationship yields an evocative taxonomy of approaches to lawyering: lawyers can be godfathers, gurus, hiredguns, legalists, orfriends (the latter being
the preferred concept):
The godfather lawyer ignores the interests of other people, keeps the
issue to himself, and does what he thinks will benefit the client. The

168. See id. ("Some are surprised that as a Christian, I do not advocate an authoritarian approach to
lawyering.").
169. See id.
170. See id. at 690 ("None of us has the perfect ability to discern moral standards or to determine
how they should apply.").
171. See id. (stating that the authoritarian approach is "inconsistent with the humility with which
lawyers should view themselves").
172. See id.
173. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 28-29.
174. See id. at 29.
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hired gun defers to whatever the client wants to do. The guru considers the interests of other people, and controls the decision by aggressively persuading the client to do what the lawyer believes to be
the right thing. . . . [The legalist] assumes and justifies the morality
of the law. . . . [N]either the lawyer nor the client controls the decisions. The morality of the law controls the decisions.1 75 [T]he lawyer
as friend . . . raises the moral issue with the client, engages the client
in moral conversation, and seeks to arrive at moral decisions with the
client. Only when the client insists on doing something the lawyer
believes to be wrong-only, that is, when moral conversation failswould the lawyer-as-friend insist on following his own conscience. 176
The preferred model of the lawyer as friend does not mean that the lawyers should seek to be friends, in the ordinary sense of that word, with every
client they encounter.17 7 Rather, the lawyer and client should deal with moral
issues that arise in representation in the way that friends deal with moral issues. 17 ' Even this limitation raises questions, however: How, exactly, do
friends deal with moral issues? What does it mean to be a friend?
Shaffer and Cochran recognize that the debate about the lawyer-client relationship cannot be settled simply by invoking the notion of friendship; just
as there are competing accounts of the lawyer-client relationship, there are
also competing accounts of what it means to be a friend. 179 Shaffer and
Cochran's preferred account of friendship is Aristotle's, which includes the
idea (surprising today) that friends are engaged in common moral projects.180
For Shaffer and Cochran, however, the idea of a friend as "a collaborator in
the good" is the lynchpin of their application of friendship to the lawyer-client

175. Cochran & Shaffer, "Technical" Defenses, supra note 144, at 337, 348. The "legalist" is concemed neither with the impact on others, nor with the moral concerns of either the lawyer or the client.
The legalist lawyer is governed by the values embedded in the law itself, such that any relevant moral
concerns are deemed to have already been taken into account. Whatever courses of action the law
permits are thereby deemed moral. See id.
176. See id.
177.

SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 47.

178. See
with moral
matters for
179. See
180. See
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id. ("The lawyer should raise moral issues with the client in the way that good friends deal
issues, neither ignoring them nor imposing their values on the friend, but raising them as
discussion.").
id. (noting that "we live in what Alasdair Maclntyre describes as a society of strangers").
id. ("We use the term 'friend' in its traditional meaning, as developed by Aristotle.").
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relationship.11
Again, we see that Shaffer and Cochran assume that legal representation
involves joint decision making (the lawyer and client are, in this sense, "collaborators"), and that decision making involves moral choices (they collaborate "in the good"). 18 2 Again, following Aristotle, Shaffer, and Cochran agree
that friendship (and thus the lawyer-client relationship) is, ideally, a "school
for virtue."1 8 3 Like a friendship, the lawyer-client relationship can present
moral issues that allow both lawyers and clients to better learn to care for
others and present opportunities for conversations that allow the collaborators
to see more clearly the truth about themselves and the situation they face.1"'
Finally, both friendships and lawyer-client relationships involve a shared deliberation about what constitutes a good course of action in a given situation.185
The friendship relationship relativizes the moral framework of professionalism through which contemporary lawyers and clients are likely to view
the lawyer-client relationship: "When a client is your friend," Shaffer and
Cochran write, "client interest is not so much a purpose as a project." 18 6 On
this account, friends are interested in becoming better, more virtuous people,
even if this involves some degree of mutual moral correction.18 7
Many would acknowledge that there is a surface appeal to thinking of the
lawyer-client relationship in terms of friendship, especially since Shaffer and
Cochran are careful to structure the model in a way that attempts to assure that
lawyers and clients are equals in the moral deliberation that ensues.' On the
other hand, however, why should ethical practices for a public profession like
law be built around a confessedly controversial notion of what lawyer-client

181. See id. at 49 ("Most importantly, friendship is a relationship in which the lawyer sees the client
as a collaborator in the good.").
182. See id. at 49, 50 ("Friends can help us to be better people by helping us to determine the right
thing to do.").
183. See id. at 47.
184. See id. at 45-50.
185. Id. at 50 (noting that "[d]etermining what the good requires can be a difficult task" and such
"hard thought" requires the help of friends).
186. Id. at 50.
187. See id. at 47, 48 (citing AQUINAS, supra note 94, II, Q.33, 1333-41).
188. See id. at 48-52.
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relationships should be? Would it not be better to build those rules and practices around moral conceptions that we all share?18 9 What is the use of a selfconsciously particularist model of the good life as applied to lawyer-client
relations?
Professor Cochran's legal ethics scholarship provides a number of answers to these questions.1 9 0 First, he does not concede that the sought-after
neutral principles around which we might build a universally acceptable
model of legal ethics are available.1 9 1 Indeed, as noted earlier, he argues that
adverting to broad concepts like "professionalism" to paper over our disagreements is likely to do more harm than good. 19 2 So, what is to be done?
Interestingly, Cochran makes moves that operate on parallel tracks. The
separatist Cochran suggests that even if mainstream practitioners might be
uncomfortable with practicing law under a friendship model, some lawyers
should do so anyway. 19 3 And he buttresses this suggestion with articles attempting to demonstrate that legal rules do not place the friendship model
beyond the pale.1 9 4 The Model Rules, he notes, specifically authorize lawyers
to bring moral judgments into the lawyer client relationship.1 9 5 More dramatically, relevant ethical standards do not prevent cooperation between lawyers
to generate a good result in a given situation, even where such an approach
might result in an individual client receiving a smaller recovery than might
otherwise be attainable.1 9 6 Even criminal lawyers, he argues, may want to

189. See, e.g., Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO.

J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1084 (2010) (highlighting the importance of a lawyer's "ability to analyze the
moral commitments embedded in and underlying the legal system within which she works").
190. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
191. See Cochran,supra note 110, at 308-12 ("There is probably less common moral ground within
the legal profession now than in 1983.").
192. See id. at 311.
193. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 48-49 (discussing four reasons lawyers may be
hesitant to discuss moral issues under the friendship model).
194. See id. at 52 ("The local nature of law practice makes it likely that lawyers will share, or at
least be familiar with, the moral values of their clients, as clients are likely to be attracted to lawyers
who share their moral values.").
195. See id. at 48 n. 11 (citing to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (Am. BAR AsS'N 2008))

(stating "in rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to the law but to other considerations such
as moral. .. factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation").
196. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., CollaborativePractice'sRadical Possibilitiesfor the Legal Pro"[Two Lawyers and Two Clients]for the Situation," 11 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 229 (2011);
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 537
(2009); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40 PEPP. L. REV.

fession:

351 (2013).
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discuss the moral benefits of confession with their clients (although Cochran
is quick to add that there may be good reasons that a client will not want to
confess). 197
At the same time, Cochran's thickly conceived account of what appropriate lawyer-client relations should look like gives rise to bold "conversionist"
suggestions about what the law governing all lawyer-client relationships
should become.198 For example, Cochran advocates that tort standards and
professional rules should place greater limits on the tactical decisions that
lawyers can make without client consent when such decisions have the potential to inflict relational harms to their clients.199 Similarly, he argues that the
common requirement that clients plead either "guilty" or "not guilty" has
moral ramifications for victims and thus should be abandoned. 200 In the absence of a plea, the state would simply be obligated to prove its case as it
currently must, but the client should otherwise not be forced to make a plea
that a layperson would likely perceive to be a lie. 201
V.

COCHRAN AS COMMUNITY ORGANIZER

As detailed above, Professor Cochran's theoretical and practical contributions to legal scholarship have been substantial and innovative. That said,
his most lasting contributions will, in all likelihood, have been made in his
work as an important force in helping create and sustain Christian legal scholarship as a field of study. His most influential work, the 2001 Yale University
Press volume Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought (co-edited with Michael McConnell and Angela Carnella) was the most visible American contribution to self-consciously Christian legal scholarship in decades; so much
so, that when Harold Berman wrote the foreword to the book, he suggested
197. See Cochran, Roadblock or Bridge, supranote 152, at 222.
198. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 146, at 49 (recommending a drastic shift in how
lawyers operate and how they are perceived).
199. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposalthat the Model
Rules Require Lawyers to PresentADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 183, 197-98 (1999);
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney
Malpracticefor the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to
Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 819, 836-40 (1990); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ProfessionalRules
and ADR: Control ofAlternative Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other ProfessionalResponsibility Standards, 28 FORDHA1viURB. L.J. 895, 901-06 (2001).

200. See Cochran, Roadblock or Bridge, supranote 152, at 219-20.
201. See id. at 227-28; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., How Do You Plead, Guilty or Not Guilty?: Does the
Plea Inquiry Violate the Defendant'sRight to Silence?, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2005).
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that Christianity "ha[d] been a taboo subject in twentieth-century American
legal education." 20 2 The book consisted of essays that began as presentations
at meetings of the Law Professors Christian Fellowship, a group that-in the
early years-Professor Cochran almost single-handedly organized, recruited
speakers for, raised money to support, and in which he remained the leading
force for the roughly two decades of its existence. 20 3 Once Professor Cochran
became the founding director of the Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and
Ethics at Pepperdine, the annual conferences there became unofficial gathering and networking sites for meetings of Christian law professors. 20 4
Cochran's ecumenical evangelical approach was visible from the beginning in these meetings, as well as in the books and articles they spawned. As
already noted, the 1997 JournalofLegal Education symposium featured articles from Catholic, Calvinist, Anabaptist, and Lutheran perspectives about
law.20 5 ChristianPerspectives on Legal Thought, still in print nearly 20 years
later, widens the circle, featuring articles not only from differing theological
perspectives, but also offering Christian perspectives influenced by critical
20 6
race theory, feminist thought, economic analysis, and other approaches.
Cochran and Richard Garnett organized a group of Catholic and
Protestant law professors that produced not only a statement of common
Christian principles regarding law, "but many significant friendships among
those in [the] two communities." 20 7 Pepperdine conferences yielded edited
volumes published by elite university presses and Pepperdine Law Review
symposia on subjects including the relationship between law and Christian
love, "higher law," and the Bible. 20 8 These conferences included not only a
diversity of theological perspectives, but also those from other faiths and no
religious faith. 20 9 And Cochran's organizing and editing skills resulted in at

202. See CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at xi.
203. See id. at xv.

204. See Annual Conference, PEPP. L., https://law.pepperdine.edu/nootbaar-institute/annual-conference/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
205. See, e.g., Cochran,supra note 68.
206. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20.

207. See Joint Statement by Evangelical and Catholic Legal Scholars, Evangelicals and Catholics
Together on Law: The Lord of Heaven and Earth, 3 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 2, 2 (2013),

https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/evangelicals-and-catholics-together-on-law-the-lord-ofheaven-and-earth.pdf.
208. See, e.g., AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND THE LAW, supranote 44; LAW AND THE BIBLE, supra note 27;
Symposium, Is There a Higher Law? Does it Matter?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 5 (2009).

209. See Symposium, supra note 208.
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least one volume on religious legal thought that moved beyond Christian ecumenism to interfaith dialogue. 2 10
The conferences Cochran organized and the publications that resulted did
more than simply provide new resources for those desiring to understand the
relevance of Christian thought for law, legal theory, and law practice. They
provided venues for scholarly publications that facilitated the research itself,
opportunities for friendships and professional relationships, a forum for discussion and presentation of ideas that were and remain, for the most part, outside the mainstream of legal scholarship, and an enhanced understanding between scholars of different backgrounds and viewpoints. Future scholars
interested in the relationship between Christianity and law will find more and
better resources available because of Professor Cochran's investment in others.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even if one appreciates the evident generosity of spirit underlying Professor Cochran's approach to law and legal theory, one might still wonder
whether it makes sense to be an ecumenical evangelical. Is it possible to hold
together so many disparate approaches (even disparate Christian approaches)
with intellectual integrity?
In one of his contributions to ChristianPerspectives on Legal Thought,
Professor Cochran provides three possible answers. 2 11 The first he calls "balance," suggesting that Christians should be able to gain insights from each
other's traditions. 2 12 "Synthesists," he writes,
remind Christians that we can learn from culture; conversionists remind us that we can have an impact on this fallen world; separatists
remind us of the temptations . . . that accompany involvement with
culture; dualists remind us that our views are also corrupted; and culturalists remind us of the ways in which culture may already coincide
with Christian teaching. 2 13

210. See ROBERT F.

COCHRAN, JR., FAITH AND LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS

TRADITIONS FROM

CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN LAW (2008).

211. See CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20, at 250.
212. See id.
213. See id.
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Cochran also argues that responding to culture in one's own moment requires us to "read[] the times." 2 1 4 Taking the Bible as his primary source,
Cochran notes that different figures responded to issues of law and politics in
different ways, depending on the situation in which the people of God found
themselves. 215 Finally, he argues that the proper response may be a "matter
of calling. . . . God might call some to play one role and others to play another." 216
While I agree with all three of Professor Cochran's suggestions on this
front, I am not sure they would be persuasive to, for example, a "committed"
separatist. 217 I suspect that these suggestions are more helpful to explain the
benefits of separatist or synthesist thought to conversionists, like Cochran and
me, than, for example, to persuade committed separatists that secular culture
has lessons to teach them after all, or to persuade committed culturalists that
the Bible requires their preferred culture to change its ways in important respects.
My guess is that the drivers of Professor Cochran's ecumenical evangelicalism run deeper than these particular arguments and reflect more the Christian virtues of humility and modesty (too little seen in current times) than a
tightly reasoned conception of the way Niebuhr's five categories might somehow fit together after all. One could argue (and I now shall) that for Professor
Cochran, the more important categories for his approach to law and legal theory are the old evangelical categories of creature and redeemed sinner. The
full body of Professor Cochran's work reflects not only a commitment to the
life of the mind as usually understood, but also a commitment of the hearthis understanding of himself as finite and therefore not in possession of all
knowledge, fallen and therefore needing correction wherever it can be found,
and called to love the Lord his God with heart and mind and soul and strength
and his neighbor as himself
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